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SUBSIDIARITY AND/OR HUMAN RIGHTS
Daniel T. Murphy*
The post-Maastricht world of the European Union is only
about two years old. Within that new world, however, few con-
cepts are as important, and yet as elusive or unsettled, as the
doctrine of subsidiarity. On the other hand, the European Com-
munity has for many years evidenced concern over human
rights.' The purpose of this essay is to consider the implica-
tions of the concept of subsidiarity for human rights law and
enforcement within the European Community and the European
Union.2
The doctrine of subsidiarity has only recently been imported
into the lore of the European Community and Union.' Although
* Professor of Law, The T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond.
1. See, e.g., Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the
Commission, April 5, 1977, 1977 O.J. (C 103) 1, in which the three political institu-
tions of the Community affirmed the importance they attach to the protection of
fundamental rights and declared that they would respect such rights in the exercise
of their powers; see also Case 29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm, 1969 E.C.R. 419.
2. The discussion in this paper will focus on the European Community, rather
than the European Union, although consideration will be given to the issue of
subsidiarity within the context of the European Union as well. See infra notes 83-88
and accompanying text. For an explanation of the distinction between the European
Community and the European Union, see infra note 6.
Given the uncertainties surrounding the principle of subsidiarity, conclusions
regarding its application to the area of human rights are per force highly tentative.
3. Subsidiarity has been vociferously debated in Europe, but only for about the
past five years. George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the
European Community and the United States, 94 COLuM. L. REV. 331, 332 (1994).
However, the doctrine had been suggested as early as 1975 when the Commission
submitted a report on European Union to the Council. Report on European Union, 8
BULL. EuR. COMMiUNITY, Supp. 5, (1975). In that report the Commission stated that
to prevent the proposed Union from becoming a "superstate," the Union should have
responsibility only for those matters with which the member states were not capable
of dealing effectively. Id. at 10; Akos G. Toth, The Principle of Subsidiarity in the
Maastricht Treaty, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1079, 1088 (1992).
The subsidiarity principle was imported into the law of the EC in the 1985
Single European Act, but in only one area: the environment. Single European Act,
Feb. 17, 1986, art. 25, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1. The Single European Act added a new
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its parameters may be vague, the principle could hardly be
more deeply embedded in the Union law and culture, however,
inasmuch as it is enshrined in the 1992 Treaty on European
Union ("TEU").4 This treaty radically reshaped the European
Economic Community through amendments to the Treaty of
Rome.5 As importantly, the TEU added significant new dimen-
sions to Europe through the establishment of the European Un-
ion and the objectives assigned to it. 6
article to the Treaty of Rome relating to environmental protection, Article 130r.
Subpart 4 of Article 130r notes that the Community should take action in this area
to the extent that the objective can be attained better at the Community level than
at the level of the member states. Id. at 12-13.
4. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1 [hereinafter
TEU] (signed at Maastricht).
5. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]. Throughout this piece the term "EC Treaty"
is used to refer to the Treaty of Rome as amended by the TEU and the term "Treaty
of Rome" is used to refer to the treaty in its pre-Maastricht version, including the
amendments contained in the Single European Act.
6. The TEU contains seven titles. Title II contains the amendments to the Trea-
ty of Rome. These amendments themselves are by no means minor. In addition to ar-
ticulation of the subsidiarity principle, this title treats citizenship of the Union (Title
I); the new economic policies and the significant new monetary system, with a single
currency and separate institutions (Title VI); and it adds new sections dealing, among
other things, with social policy, education and vocational training (Title VIII); culture
(Title IX); public health (Title X); and development cooperation (Title XVII). In sev-
eral of the remaining titles, the TEU establishes the European Union, which consists
of the twelve signatory states (Title I, Article A). In other substantive titles it sets
forth procedures for accomplishing the Union's objectives in the areas of common
foreign and security policies (Title V) and cooperation in the fields of justice and
home affairs (Title VI). The institutions of the European Community are charged with
assisting in the accomplishment of the Union's objectives. TEU, supra note 4, tit. I,
arts. C, E.
The role of the Court of Justice of the European Communities has not been
significantly changed or expanded by the TEU, however. In exercising its power, the
court is, with one exception, to apply only the EC Treaty, not provisions of the other
substantive parts of the TEU. tit. VI, Article K.3(2)(c) para. 3. Thus, its jurisdiction is
largely confined to matters arising under the EC Treaty.
As structured in the TEU there is permeability between the European Union
and the European Community including significant participation of the Community's
three political institutions in the work of the Union. But legally, historically, and
functionally there is a distinction between the two. The European Community, even
as its structure and functions are expanded by Title II of the TEU, is the entity
established in the Treaty of Rome.
For an exposition and assessment of the principles of the TEU generally, see
LEGAL IssuEs OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY (David OKeeffe & Patrick M. Twomey
eds., 1994) [hereinafter LEGAL IssuES]; Trevor C. Hartley, Constitutional and Institu-
tional Aspects of the Maastricht Agreement, 42 IN'L & COMP. L.Q. 213 (1993).
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The TEU adds new article 3b to the Treaty of Rome which
states the principle of subsidiarity as follows:
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence,
the Community shall take action in accordance with the
principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objec-
tives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved
by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the
scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by
the Community.7
7. TEU, supra note 4, tit. II, article G.B(4). This article reads in its entirety as
follows:
The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon
it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein.
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Commu-
nity shall take action in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity,
only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason
of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the
Community.
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to
achieve the objectives of this Treaty.
Id.
The essence of the principle of subsidiarity is contained in the second para-
graph of this article. In the English version that paragraph seems phrased a bit
awkwardly. One is tempted to read the first clause, "[i]n areas ... the principle of
subsidiarity," as equal to the second clause, "only if and in so far as . . . achieved by
the Community." If this were done, the second clause would not explain or define
subsidiarity; instead the paragraph would read that subsidiarity, however it is de-
fined, is to be applied according to the limitations in the second clause. In fact, the
second clause is the definition of subsidiarity.
The first paragraph of Article 3b restates the settled notion that the Communi-
ty and its institutions can act only within the limits of the powers conferred on them
by the EC Treaty. It does expand on this settled notion a bit. Community action
although within the power conferred by the EC Treaty is also limited to action con-
sistent with the objectives of the Treaty. See Hartley, supra note 6, at 215.
The third paragraph incorporates the principle of proportionality which has
been applied by the Court of Justice of the European Communities as part of its
jurisprudence. See generally, Akos G. Toth, A Legal Analysis of Subsidiarity, in LEGAL
ISSUES, supra note 6, at 37, 38.
A version of the subsidiarity principle was set forth in Article 12 of the Draft
Treaty on European Union, Feb. 14, 1984, 1984 O.J. (C 77) 1, (prepared and adopted
by the European Parliament, but never acted upon). See generally ROLAND BIEBER ET
AL., AN EVER CLOSER UNION, A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DRAFT TREATY ESTABLISH-
ING THE EUROPEAN UNION (1985).
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Arguments abound to the effect that the principle of
subsidiarity is an essential counter weight to the drive toward
federalism within the European Union.' It is also argued that
the principle is either mischievous or devoid of substance.'
The principle is now a common term of "Eurospeak" and is a
means whereby distribution of authority between the Communi-
ty institutions and the member states can be regulated.0 But
the term is ecclesiastical in origin. In its current form the prin-
ciple was stated in Pope Pius XI's 1931 encyclical
Quadragesimo Anno.1
8. During the debate in the United Kingdom over the proposed ratification of
the Maastricht Treaty, subsidiarity was held up as the principle which saved national
autonomy and sovereignty from being completely overrun by the EU principles and
the EU central government. See Peter Riddell & Philip Webster, 68% Say No to Eu-
rope Treaty, THE TIMES OF LONDON, Oct. 5, 1992, at 1; Peter Riddell, Major Comes
Out Fighting, THE TIMES OF LONDON, Oct. 2, 1992, at 14; see also Deborah Z. Cass,
The Word that Saves Maastricht? The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Division of
Power within the European Community, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1107 (1992). See
generally George A. Bermann, Subsidiarity and the European Community, 17
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 97 (1993); Toth, supra note 3.
9. See, e.g., Vlad Constantinesco, Who's Afraid of Subsidiarity, 1991 YEARBOOK
OF EUROPEAN LAW 33, 51; Lord Alexander J. Mackenzie-Stuart, Subsidiarity-A Bust-
ed Flush, in CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND NATIONAL
LAW, ESSAYS FOR THE HON. MR. JUSTICE T.F. O'HIGGINS 19 (Deirdre Curtin & David
O'Keeffe eds. 1992); Lord Alexander J. Mackenzie-Stuart, Letter, THE INDEPENDENT,
Jan. 15, 1992; Toth, supra note 7. See also the numerous authorities cited in
Bermann, supra note 3, at 331 nn.1-7 & 347 n.51.
10. See Nicholas Emiliou, Subsidiarity: Panacea or Fig Leaf, in LEGAL ISSUES,
supra note 6, at 65, 66.
11. In his encyclical, Pope Pius XI noted that
just as it is wrong to withdraw from the individual and commit to a
group what private enterprise and industry can accomplish, so too it is
an injustice, a grave evil and a disturbance of the right order, for a
larger and a higher association to arrogate to itself functions with can be
performed efficiently by smaller and lower societies. This is a fundamen-
tal principle of social philosophy, unshaken and unchangeable. Of its very
nature the true aim of all social activity should be to help members of
the social body, but never destroy or absorb them.
Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno, (1931) sec. 79.
See generally J.M.E. LOMAN ET AL., CULTURE AND COMMUNITY LAW 202-04
(1992).
The principle also is one of German constitutional jurisprudence. See
Constantinesco, supra note 9, at 38; Nicholas Emiliou, Subsidiarity: An Effective Bar-
rier Against "The Enterprises of Ambition"?, 17 EUR. L. REv. 383 (1992); Emiliou,
supra note 10, at 71.
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The elements of the principle as set forth in Article 3b of the
EC Treaty are quite clear: (1) in areas of shared competence
between the Community and the member states; (2) the Com-
munity shall act only when the objectives of the proposed action
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states; and (3)
the Community shall act only when the objective can, by reason
of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved
by the Community because it cannot be achieved sufficiently by
the member states.
In a sense subsidiarity is, of course, a version of "states'
rights." The Community should act in those areas in which it
shares competence with the member states only when the objec-
tive cannot be adequately achieved by the member states.
Moreover, the presumption is in favor of member state action,
not Community action.' The Community should act only when
it is demonstrated that action by the states cannot adequately
accomplish the objective. If given full effect, this principle
clearly has the capacity to circumscribe action by Community
institutions.
So stated the principle raises a host of questions. For purpos-
es of this discussion only a few will be considered. It goes with-
out saying that the Community may, indeed must, act in those
areas in which it has, as against the member states, exclusive
competence. Likewise, of course, the member states may act,
and the Community institutions may not, in those areas where
the EC Treaty or Community policies give the Community no
authority to act. The doctrine of subsidiarity comes into play
only in the middle position, in the areas of shared or concur-
rent competence where both the Community and the member
states have the right to act. This reading of Article 3b is
straightforward, but raises the obvious though very difficult
question of where those areas of concurrent competence lie.
There is also the serious and related question of defining the
notion of shared or concurrent competence. A somewhat easier
issue, however, is to which institutions is the principle directed.
12. See Communication of the Commission on the Principle of Subsidiarity for
Transmission to the Council and Parliament, 25 BULL. EUR. COMMUNITY, No. 10, 116,
119 (1992) [hereinafter Commission Communication].
1994]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:067
To consider this latter point first, the principle as stated in
Article 3b is not directed at any particular Community institu-
tion. Instead, it is apparently to be applied by each of the insti-
tutions within its respective sphere." The principle is also in-
tended to operate on several levels. Subsidiarity's most impor-
tant value is probably at the political level. It is a guiding
principle which should inform the development of Community
policies and decision making. 4 Consequently, one specific, and
perhaps the most important, application of the principle is in
the legislative process. The Council, Commission, and the Par-
liament ought to take it into account in the development of
specific legislation. 5
Despite its overtly political character, subsidiarity is embod-
ied in an amendment to the EC Treaty. There is nothing in the
TEU or the EC Treaty which removes it from the competence of
the European Court of Justice. 6
13. Community institutions must act within their spheres of responsibility and as
charged by the provisions of the EC Treaty. EC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 3b, para.
1. Since subsidiarity is a principle of Community law contained in the EC Treaty, it
follows that each institution should apply it mutatis mutandis. For a discussion of the
sources of Community institution authority, see generally, TREVOR C. HARTLEY, THE
FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (2d ed. 1988).
The European Council is of the view that the principle is binding on all Com-
munity institutions. European Council in Edinburgh, Conclusions of the Presidency,
Dec. 11-12, 1992, at 7-8 [hereinafter Subsidiarity Guidelines] (on file with the Univer-
sity of Richmond Law Review).
14. See Bermann, supra note 3, at 366-67, 371; see also Interinstitutional
Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on
Procedures for Implementing the Principle of Subsidiarity, 25 BULL. EUR. COMMUNITY,
No. 10, 118, 119 (1993) [hereinafter Interinstitutional Agreement].
15. Such cognizance is now commonplace and is required. Pursuant to an agree-
ment among these institutions reached in the autumn of 1993, an explanatory memo-
randum accompanying any Commission legislative proposal shall include a statement
of justification under the principle of subsidiarity. Any amendment to that proposal
by the Council or the Parliament must contain a similar justification if it entails
more extensive or intensive Community action. Interinstitutional Agreement, supra
note 14, at 119.
The Commission believes that the subsidiarity principle has resulted in a reduc-
tion in the number of legislative proposals put forth in 1993 as opposed to prior
years. Commission Report to the European Council on the Adaptation of Existing
Legislation to the Subsidiarity Principle (Nov. 24, 1993), at 4 [hereinafter Adaptation
Report] (on file with the University of Richmond Law Review). In the Adaptation
Report the Commission set forth categories of rules and regulations which it suggests
should be recast, simplified or repealed as a consequence of subsidiarity.
For an explanation of the Community's legislative process after the TEU see
JOSEPHINE SHAW, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 78-85 (1993).
16. But for one exception the court's jurisdiction does not extend to issues arising
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Subsidiarity, thus, has become a principle of Community law
which the court should employ in reviewing issues. 7 In this
under or activities undertaken pursuant to titles of the TEU other than Title II. See
supra note 6. The court's jurisdiction is to apply Community law, including the EC
Treaty, in reviewing acts of the institutions, and subsidiarity is part of the Treaty.
See generally Akos G. Toth, Is Subsidiarity Justiciable?, 19 EuR. L. REV. 268 (1994)
The European Council believes that interpretation of the principle of
subsidiarity as well as review of legislation for compliance with it are matters for the
Court of Justice. Subsidiarity Guidelines, supra note 13, at 9.
Regarding jurisdiction of the court see generally L. NEVILLE BROWN & FRANCIS
G. JACOBS, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMIUNITIES (2d ed. 1983);
HARTLEY, supra note 13, ch. 2; STEPHEN WEATHERHILL & PAUL BEAUMONT, THE ES-
SENTIAL GUIDE TO THE LEGAL WORKINGS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 165 (1993).
17. See Bermann, supra note 3, at 390; Hartley, supra note 6, at 216; Josephine
Steiner, Subsidiarity under the Maastricht Treaty, in LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 6, at
49, 62; Toth, supra note 16.
Some argue to the contrary that the court is not fit to determine compliance
with the subsidiarity principle. Lord MacKenzie-Stuart, formerly a judge and Presi-
dent of the court, views the principle as a political one. He acknowledges with frus-
tration that the TEU places responsibility for its interpretation and application with
the Court of Justice.
The interpretation of subsidiarity is a political issue and not one for the
Court of Justice .... Maastricht, however, placed that responsibility
squarely on its shoulders. Worse . . . the definition of subsidiarity con-
tained in the Treaty... is a rich and prime example of gobbledygook
embracing simultaneously two opposed concepts of subsidiarity. To regard
the chosen formula as a constitutional safeguard shows great optimism.
Lord MacKenzie-Stuart, supra note 9. See Emiliou, supra note 10, at 77.
Compliance with the principle and compliance with the Interinstitutional Agree-
ment, supra note 14, for example, would be an issue in reviewing the legality of
legislation under Article 173 of the EC Treaty, just as is compliance with other proce-
dures in the legislative process. Presumably the court would not substitute its deter-
mination as to whether the legislation complies with the principle, but rather would
decide whether the law makers had engaged in a "subsidiarity analysis." An example
of what such a "subsidiarity analysis" might entail is contained in Subsidiarity
Guidelines, supra note 13, at 10.
Compliance with the subsidiarity principle could be raised in an action brought
by a Community institution or member state under Articles 169 or 170 of the EC
Treaty. The issue could also be raised in the request for a preliminary ruling by a
court in a member state under Article 177. An applicant may argue that a piece of
Community legislation on which its case depends is invalid since it is contrary to the
principle. See generally Bermann, supra note 3, at 390-403; Toth, supra note 16, at
273-80.
It is generally agreed that the principle does not have "direct effect" within the
member states, that is it does not give rise to private rights. In the Subsidiarity
Guidelines the European Council explicitly stated its view that subsidiarity has no
direct effect within member states. Subsidiarity Guidelines, supra note 13, at 9. See
Toth, supra note 16, at 278. But this fact does not affect application of the principle
in the Article 177 reference context. The issue before the national court will not be
Article 3b, but the compatibility of some national legislative measure or governmental
act with some piece of Community legislation. When the national court refers such an
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context subsidiarity appears to be both a substantive and a
procedural principle.18 In a procedural sense the principle will
require that in taking action, the Community institutions con-
sider whether such action meets the test of subsidiarity.' 9 In a
substantive sense, it articulates what that standard is. One of
the ironies of this aspect of subsidiarity is that it may force the
court, which has been one of the driving forces toward the
centralization of authority within the Community and the su-
premacy of Community law,2 ° to uphold a principle which may
retard the process of integration and which literally ascribes a
paramount role to the member states.2'
The issue of what substantive areas the subsidiarity principle
regulates is an extremely difficult one. The problem certainly
does not lie in the articulation of the principle. Article 3b quite
clearly indicates that the doctrine is inapplicable in those areas
in which the Community has exclusive competence. Rather it is
operative only in those areas in which there is shared or con-
current competence." The difficulty, of course, is that the EC
Treaty does not delineate those areas which are exclusively
within the purview of the EC or those in which it shares com-
petence with the member states. Moreover, there is uncertainty
as to the meaning of the concepts of exclusive and shared com-
petence.
Prior to the TEU the focus of the analysis was Community
competence versus member state competence, and, in an organi-
zational sense, on the allocation of competencies among the
institutions.' Shared competence was of less concern. The
issue to the Court of Justice for its opinion, the Court of Justice will have the oppor-
tunity to review the validity of the pertinent Community legislation on subsidiarity
grounds as well as all other grounds. Toth, supra note 16, at 278.
For a discussion of whether the principle of subsidiarity otherwise constrains
the court see infra notes 105-13 and accompanying text.
18. See Bermann, supra note 3, at 390-95.
19. See Interinstitutional Agreement, supra note 14.
20. See generally, Hartley, supra note 6, at 217; Stephen Weatherhill, Beyond Pre-
emption? Shared Competence and Constitutional Change in the European Community,
in LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 6, at 13, 15.
21. On the other hand, since the principle is so elusive, the court may have the
opportunity to narrow its scope or virtually define it away. See Hartley, supra note 6,
at 217.
22. By definition it does not operate in areas in which the Union has exclusive or
no competence.
23. Constantinesco, supra note 9, at 51.
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Treaty of Rome contained little helpful guidance in this delinea-
tion. Indeed, given the even broader ambit of authority con-
ferred on Community institutions by Article 235' and expan-
sive interpretation of authority by the Court of Justice,26 the
dominance of Community competence over member state compe-
tence in areas 'relating to the Treaty of Rome was fairly
great.'
The TEU did not clarify this issue. The injection in Title II of
the doctrine of subsidiarity focused attention on the murky
issue of shared competence and shifted the inquiry from the al-
location of competence among the institutions to an analysis of
subject matter allocation.'
24. See Toth, supra note 7, at 39.
25. See generally HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 103.
26. Hartley, supra note 6, at 217; Weatherhill, supra note 20, at 15.
27. Hartley, supra note 6, at 217. The Commission was of the view that the
Community has exclusive competence in six areas: 1) removal of barriers to the free
flow of goods, persons, services and capital; 2) common agricultural policy; 3) general
rules on competition; 4) common organization of agricultural markets; 5) conservation
of fisheries resources; and 6) essential elements of a transportation policy. Commis-
sion Communication, supra note 12, at 121. The Commission believed that measures
necessary for forming a single market were encompassed within the first category. It
raised the question about "flanking measures," such as the environment, which are
implicated in the single market measures, but are broader. See for example Case
300/89, Commission v. Council, 1991 E.C.R. 2867, 3 C.M.L.R. 358 (1993), which in-
volved the issue of whether a harmonization directive regarding reduction of titanium
dioxide waste was properly enacted. The Council acted pursuant to Article 130s of
the Treaty of Rome, governing environmental legislation. The Commission challenged
the effectiveness of the directive before the court, arguing, successfully as it turned
out, that the directive should have been based on Article 10Oa of the Treaty of Rome
regarding accomplishment of the single market. The Commission also took the nar-
rower view that such "flanking measures" did not expand the Community's exclusive
competence to encompass member state competence. Commission Communication,
supra note 12, at 121.
It has been argued that such an enumerated list supports the proposition that
virtually everything arising under the Treaty of Rome is part of the Community's
exclusive competence, and that subsidiarity is thus inapplicable when the Community
acts even now within any area covered by Treaty of Rome. Toth, supra note 3, at
1091; Toth, supra note 7, at 41.
It is also argued more narrowly that the Community's exclusive competence ex-
tends to all areas under the treaty in which the Community is given the authority to
take binding measures, and in which the Community has so acted. Hartley, supra
note 6, at 216.
28. Constantinesco, supra note 9, at 51. For a discussion of where human rights
fits into this allocation of competence, see infra notes 89-101 and accompanying text.
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Perhaps the question of what "exclusive" and "shared" compe-
tence mean should be settled prior to determining what are the
areas of exclusive competence. Although the answer is clear in
the abstract, application of the answer creates great uncertainty
as to the reality of the distinction. Exclusive Community compe-
tence is straightforward. The Community occupies such areas to
the exclusion of member states who have no right to legislate
in those fields.29 Shared or concurrent competence means that
either the Community or the member states have the right to
occupy that particular area. Once the Community has legislated
in the area, however, the area becomes part of its exclusive
competence. ° Because of the supremacy of Community law,
the reverse is not true. The fact that some or all of the member
states have legislated in a field does not preclude the Commu-
nity from legislating in and occupying that field. Once a field is
so occupied by the Community, member states are ousted from
the area. Shared competence is different from mixed compe-
tence, under which each actor would continue to have a right to
act.3
To the point of this piece, the relation of subsidiarity to hu-
man rights is quite unsettled. The EC Treaty is not intended as
a human rights document and does not contain a comprehen-
29. See Toth, supra note 16, at 268-69.
30. Emiliou, supra note 11, at 392; Hartley, supra note 6, at 216; Weatherhill,
supra note 20, at 14.
31. "Shared" or "concurrent" competence is distinct from the concept of "mixed"
competence:
"iMlixed competence", a concept originally used in the field of treaty-mak-
ing, . . . refers to a situation where an international agreement which
the Community intends to conclude covers matters which are not fully
within Community competence. Therefore, the competence of the Member
States has to be added to that of the Community: both the Community
and the Member States must act jointly.
Toth, supra note 16, at 269.
In a sense, it is safe to cynically conclude that shared or concurrent compe-
tence works in only one way-so long as the Community does not act. When it acts,
the area becomes part of the Community's exclusive competence. Subsidiarity would
thus be applicable only the first time that the Community acted in a particular area.
Hartley, supra note 6, at 216.
This understanding of shared and exclusive competence is a premise to the
conclusion that subsidiarity does not apply to anything within the Treaty of Rome.
See supra note 27. Any area in which the Community has acted has become part of
its exclusive competence. Thus, further action in that area is Community exclusive
and, by definition, not subject to subsidiarity.
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sive set of human rights norms or protections." However, scat-
tered throughout the EC Treaty are some explicit provisions of
a human rights character. Article 7 of the EC Treaty prohibits
discrimination on the grounds of nationality in the application
of the Community's activities and charges the Council to pro-
mulgate rules to enforce this prohibition.' Articles 48 to 51
assure the free movement of workers within the Community.3
Gender equality in the area of equal pay for equal work is
assured by Article 119. 3' But there is no particular emphasis
in the treaty on human rights. This listing makes clear that
such treaty-based rights as they exist are limited to the context
of the economic nature of the Treaty of Rome.
The actions of the Community institutions to apply and in-
deed expand these human rights-like provisions have been man-
ifold.
The Community's legislative effort regarding human rights
has been extensive. There are no doubt hundreds of regulations
and directives which could be considered to have human rights
aspects.36 But again these measures are not part of an overall
32. There is no reason that it should contain such a set of protections. As origi-
nally conceived, the EC Treaty was of an economic nature. Those human rights provi-
sions which it included are in that context. For discussions of human rights aspects
of the EC, see RALPH BEDDARD, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EuROPE 33 (3d ed. 1993); ANDREW
CLAPHAMi, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE ch. 8 (1993); Andrew Clapham, A
Human Rights Policy for the European Community 1990 Y.B. ER. L. 309 (1990);
Manfred A. Dauses, The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the Community Legal
Order, 10 EuR L. REV. 398 (1985); Jean Paul Jacqu6, The Convention and the Eu-
ropean Communities in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS (Ronald St.J. MacDonald et al. eds., 1993); M.H. Mendelson, The Impact of
European Community Law on the Implementation of the European Convention on
Human Rights, 1983 Y.B. ER. L. 99 (1983); M.H. Mendelson, The European Court of
Justice and Human Rights, 1981 Y.B. EuR. L. 125 (1981); Demetrios G. Metropoulis,
Human Rights, Incorporated: The European Community's New Line of Business, 29
STAN. J. INT'L. L. 131 (1992); Joseph H.H. Weiler, Eurocracy and Distrust: Some
Questions Concerning the Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of
Fundamental Human Rights within the Legal Order of the European Community, 61
WASH. L. REV. 1103 (1986).
33. Treaty of Rome, supra note 5, art. 7.
34. Id. art. 47.
35. Id. art. 119.
36. See, e.g., Regulation 1251170 on the Right of Workers to Remain in the Ter-
ritory of a Member State After Having Been Employed in that State, 1979-fl O.J.
SPEC. ED. 402; Council Regulation 1612/68 on Freedom of Movement for Workers
Within the Community. 1968-11 O.J. SPEC. ED. 475; Council Directive on the Ap-
proximation of the Laws of the Member States Relating to the Safeguarding of
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scheme to adopt human rights norms. Instead, they are mea-
sures implementing various provisions of the treaty, and like
the treaty based rights themselves, are concentrated in the
economic arena.
In addition to these legislative measures there have been
calls from Community institutions for adoption of a more com-
prehensive approach to human rights and for a deeper institu-
tional commitment to their protection."
The European Court of Justice, as in most other areas of
Community law, has been extremely active in the human rights
context. Early on it developed a jurisprudence of human rights
which it frequently applied, and one to which the political insti-
tutions have rallied."8 This effort began in a trilogy of cases
quite some time ago.
In Stauder v. Ulm39 the court was confronted with slightly
different requirements stemming from differing translations of a
Commission decision regarding the sale of Community surplus
butter at less than the market price to citizens of member
states receiving social assistance. The German version of the
decision stated that member states must adopt measures neces-
Employees' Rights in the Event of Transfers of Undertakings, Businesses or Parts of
Businesses, 1977 O.J. (L 61) 26; Council Directive on the Implementation of the Prin-
ciple of Equal Treatment for Men and Women as Regards Access to Employment,
Vocational Training and Promotion and Working Conditions, 1976 O.J. (L 39) 40;
Council Directive on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member States Relating to
the Application of the Principle of Equal Pay for Equal Work, 1975 O.J. (L 45) 19;
Commission Directive 486/77 on the Education of Children of Migrant Workers, 1974
O.J. (C 13) 1.
37. For example: (i) a 1976 Commission report to the Parliament, The Protection
of Fundamental Rights in the European Community, 9 BULL. EUR. COMMUNITY, Supp.,
5, (1976), in which it argued that the best method of protecting human rights could
be achieved by the Court of Justice's use of such norms as general principles of law;
(ii) the 1977 Joint Declaration by the Parliament, the Council and the Commission,
supra note 1, in which these institutions declared that they would respect human
rights in the exercise of their powers; (iii) a 1979 Commission report urging the Com-
munity to adopt the European Convention on Human Rights, Accession of the Com-
munities to the European Convention on Human Rights, 12 BuLL. EUR. COiMUNITY 2
(Supp. 1979); and (iv) in 1989 the Parliament adopted a set of human rights norms,
European Parliament, Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, 1989 O.J. (C
120) 52. See also Single European Act, supra note 3, preamble.
38. See The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the European Community, supra
note 37.
39. Case 29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm, 1969 E.C.R. 419, 9 C.M.L.R. 112 (1970).
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sary to assure that recipients receive the butter only upon pre-
sentation of a coupon made out in their name.0 Other lan-
guage texts of the decision stated only that the recipient must
present an "individualized" coupon, thereby allowing means of
identification other than the individual's name. Stauder, a
German citizen, argued that it was a breach of his basic rights
as set forth in the German constitution to be required to dis-
close his name in this context. The European Court of Justice
followed the more liberal translation of the decision. In doing so
the court noted that so interpreted, the issue "does not contain
any element that might jeopardize the fundamental rights of
the individual contained in the general principles of the law of
the Community of which the Court must ensure the
observance."
41
The second and more expansive case, Internationale
Handelsgesellschaft42 also entailed a reference from a German
court. The Community by regulation had established a proce-
dure that required an exporter of cereals to obtain an export
certificate and to pay a deposit. The deposit would be forfeited
if the exporter did not export the cereals within the time speci-
fied in the export certificate.43  Petitioner, Internationale
40. Id. at 425, 9 C.M.L.R. at 117.
41. Id. at 425, 9 C.M.L.R. at 119. This language in the judgment was not essen-
tial to the ruling, as the court also determined that with respect to differing require-
ments in the various language texts, preference should be give to the least onerous
interpretation. Id. at 425, 9 C.M.L.R. at 118. The Commission had also previously
supported an amendment to the decision making clear that tender of a coupon bear-
ing the recipients name was not required. Id. at 425, 9 C.M.L.R. at 116.
The court's position that fundamental rights are enshrined in general principles
of Community law and protected by the court is strikingly different from that taken
about ten years earlier in Case 1158, Freidrich Stork & Co. v. High Authority of the
European Coal and Steel Community, 1959 E.C.R. 17. That case, like Nold, see infra
notes 47 & 48 and accompanying text, involved a challenge to the joint selling rules
for Ruhr Basis coal approved by the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel
Community. Applicant sought to annul a decision which eliminated it from the class
of first tier wholesalers. It argued that this decision violated certain rights under the
German constitution, including that of free development of personality. The court held
that it had no jurisdiction to annul a decision on the basis of national, not Commu-
nity law. Stauder, 1969 E.C.R. at 425, 9 C.M.L.R. at 6. See Mendelson, The European
Court of Justice and Human Rights, supra note 32, at 124.
42. Case 11170, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und
Vorratsstelle Fur Getreide und Futtermittel, 1972 E.C.R. 1125, 11 C.M.L.R. 255
(1972).
43. Council Regulation, 120/67 of 13 September 1967, 1967 J.O. (117) 2269; Com-
mission Regulation 473/67 of 21 August 1967, 1967 J.O. (204) 16.
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Handelsgesellschaft, did not complete an export transaction
during the time specified in the applicable certificate and its
deposit was forfeited. It brought an action in a German admin-
istrative court seeking return of the deposit. The administrative
court referred certain questions to the European Court of
Justice."
The court ruled that the regulatory scheme did not pose an
excessive burden and that such burdens as it did entail were a
normal result of a market organization system structured to
meet the general interest of the Community.45 But it acknowl-
edged that the compatibility of the scheme with fundamental
rights must be considered. The court noted that such rights,
although they are "inspired by the constitutional principles
common to the member-states, must be ensured within the
framework of the Community's structure and objective."46
In the third of these cases, Nold v. Commission,"' applicant,
a German coal wholesaler, sought annulment of a Commission
decision which accepted the German coal producer Ruhrkohle
AG's new rules on conditions of sale. These new rules stated
different requirements as to the minimum quantities of coal
first line wholesalers had to purchase in order to maintain the
right to purchase directly from the producer. Wholesalers not
meeting this requirement would not be able to purchase from
the producer, but would have to purchase from a first line
wholesaler. Applicant challenged this decision before the Court
44. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 1972 E.C.R. at 1126-27, 11 C.M.L.R. at 258.
Although the referring court did not phrase the question in this way, the court
deemed that the referring court was questioning the compatibility of the relevant
Community regulations with the principles of freedom of action and disposition, eco-
nomic liberty and proportionality which flow from Articles 2(1) and 14 of the German
Constitution. Id. at 1154, 11 C.M.L.R. at 282.
45. Id. at 1155, 11 C.M.L.R. at 285.
46. Id. at 1154, 11 C.M.L.R. at 283.
47. Case 4/73, Firma J. Nold KG v. E.C. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 491, 14
C.M.L.R. 338 (1974).
48. The facts in this case involved a central selling organization for coal produced
in the Ruhr Basin which predated formation of the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity. The High Authority under that convention authorized the joint sale of coal sub-
ject to certain conditions. The Commission, as successor to the High Authority, autho-
rized new trading rules which altered the previous rules in certain respects. It is that
decision which applicant Nold sought to have annulled. See Commission Decision,
1973 O.J. (L 120) 14.
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of Justice on various grounds, including that the decision violat-
ed certain of its fundamental rights. By being relegated to the
status of second tier wholesaler, Nold's profitability was likely
to be injured. This, the applicant argued, violated a quasi-prop-
erty right and the right of free exercise of commercial activities
protected by the German *constitution and by various human
rights instruments, in particular the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights.4 9
The court denied the application for an annulment, ruling
that the Commission's regulation was not unreasonable. It
concluded that even if the applicant had a fundamental right in
this regard, such right would be subject to limitations in the
public interest.0 The court reaffirmed its earlier position that
"fundamental rights form an integral part of the general princi-
ples of law, the observance of which it ensures,"5 and extend-
ed this notion in two respects. The court noted that in assuring
the protection of such rights it is required to base itself on the
constitutional traditions common to the member states. There-
fore, it could not "allow [to stand] measures which are incom-
patible with fundamental rights recognized and protected by the
Constitutions of those States."52 The court also noted that in-
ternational human rights treaties to which the member states
are parties "can supply guidelines which should be followed
within the framework of Community law."
53
Several points about these three cases are noteworthy. In
none of them is the relevant treaty provision of a human rights
character. Indeed, insofar as they treat human rights issues,
these cases entail the assessment of otherwise presumably
legitimate Community acts against a body of law external to
the Treaty and Community secondary legislation. In Stauder
the corpus of such law is left unstated. But in Internationale
Handelsgesellschaft the touchstone for the rights is clearly the
constitutional principles common to the member states. The
49. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 312 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention on Hu-
man Rights].
50. Nold, 1974 E.C.R. at 506, 14 C.M.L.R. at 354.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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court in that case did not consider that it would be applying
member state constitutional protections, however. Rather it
extrapolated generalized versions of those constitutional
protections and characterized them as general principles of law.
It then incorporated those general principles as part of the law
which it is required to apply. This is clear from the language of
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft wherein the court states that
while the protection of these rights is inspired by the consti-
tutional principles of the member states, they "must be ensured
within the framework of the structure and objectives of the
Community."54
The evolution continued in Nold when the European Conven-
tion was added as another touchstone.55 But again its provi-
sions were extracted into general principles of law to be applied
by the court. The language in Nold is susceptible of a broader
reading, a reading under which the constitutional protections
and international human rights norms become part of positive
Community law which could be used to review issues unrelated
to Community objectives. The court noted .that in basing itself
on constitutional traditions, and by extension on international
54. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 1972 E.C.R. at 1133, 11 C.M.L.R. at 283.
This conclusion did not settle concern of several of the national courts regarding a
perceived lack of protection of fundamental rights within the Community order. The
German Constitutional Court ruled two years later that, so long as the Community
did not have a democratically elected parliament with legislative power and a codified
set of directly applicable human rights protections, Community secondary legislation
was not capable as a matter of German constitutional law of overriding national
human rights provisions. Case 52/71, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr-
und Vorratsstelle Fur Getreide und Futtermittel, 2 C.M.L.R. 540, 549 (1974). The
Court of Justice holdings in this trilogy would blunt such concerns by incorporating
those constitutional protections into the Community legal order and applying them as
such. In 1986 the German Constitutional Court again considered the status of Com-
munity law in relation to the fundamental rights guaranteed by the German constitu-
tion. It declared that so long as the Court of Justice generally ensured protection of
fundamental rights, it would no longer exercise its jurisdiction to decide the status of
secondary Community law vis a vis the German Constitution. Case 197/83, In re
Application of Wunsche Handelsgesellschaft, 73 BVerfGE 339, 3 C.M.L.R. 225 (1986).
See Mendelson, The European Court of Justice and Human Rights, supra note 32, at
132.
55. In Nold the court employed the term "constitutional traditions" of the member
states and also the constitutions of those states. It is not clear whether this is a dis-
tinction without a difference. Mendelson, The European Court of Justice and Human
Rights, supra note 32, at 149. In Case 374/87 Orkem v. Commission, 1989 E.C.R.
3283 (1989), the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights was referred to
as a possible source of Community rights.
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human rights treaty provisions, it could not allow "measures
which are incompatible with fundamental rights recognized and
protected by the Constitutions of those States."56 This language
could be read to mean that fundamental rights are part of
positive Community law. If they were, national legislation of
any type would, because of the supremacy of Community law,
be subject to review for compatibility with these rights. The
narrower reading confines this review to Community law or
national legislation in areas in which the Community has a
legitimate interest.
Each of these cases dealt with the compatibility of Communi-
ty law or action with human rights norms which are said to be
part of Community law in the broader sense.57 The court has
also applied Community law in this broader sense to review
national legislation.58
While the court has considered numerous cases in which
claims are based on human rights matters,59 rarely have the
decisions squarely turned on the human rights issue, or even
on the generalized version of human rights. In the three cases
previously outlined, the court found other bases for its holdings,
or determined that the Community actions were reasonable
regulation of such rights. Also, in some of its significant sub-
stantive cases having human rights dimensions such as
Defrenne v. Sabena60 and State v. Royer,"' the decisions were
reached on other grounds.
One interesting exception is Regina v. Kirk.6" This case in-
56. Nold, 1974 E.C.R. at 506, 14 C.M.L.R. at 354.
57. Throughout this discussion I use the term "Community law in the narrower
sense" to mean the law of the EC Treaty and secondary legislation, excluding human
rights norms arising from common constitutional traditions or international human
rights treaties, and "Community law in the broader sense" to include such human
rights norms.
58. See, for example, infra notes 65-82 and accompanying text.
59. See for example the lists in WEATHERHILL & BEAuMoNT, supra note 16, at
221, 222 n.150, and those discussed in CLAPHAM, supra note 32, ch. 8, and in M.H.
Mendelson, The European Court of Justice and Human Rights, supra note 32, at 130-
52. A LEXIS ECCASE Library search of "Human or fundamental rights w/100 Com-
munity law or European Community" revealed over 75 ECJ cases in which the issue
of human or fundamental rights were germane.
60. Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Soci~t6 Anonyme Belge de Navigation Adrienne
Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 455.
61. Case 48/75, State v. Royer, 1976 E.C.R. 497.
62. Case 63/83, Regina v. Kent Kirk, 1984 E.C.R. 2689. See also Joined Cases
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volved a reference from the British Crown Court. Kirk, a Dan-
ish national and captain of a Danish fishing vessel, was arrest-
ed and prosecuted for fishing within British coastal waters. He
challenged his arrest, claiming that as a Community national
he and the Danish registry vessel had the right to fish within
British coastal waters at the time of his arrest. Under the
terms of the United Kingdom's accession to the Treaty of Rome,
Britain was given the right for ten years to exclude certain
Community vessels, including Danish vessels, from fishing in
its coastal waters. This permission expired 31 Deceniber 1982.
By regulation the Council extended the permission for an addi-
tional ten years on 25 January 1983, retroactive to 1 January
1983. As luck would have it, Kirk was arrested on 6 January
1983, during the three-week period when the United Kingdom
was prohibited by Community law from excluding Kirk and the
Danish registry vessel on the basis of nationality.
The court noted that the retroactive feature of the regulation
could not validate ex poste facto penal measures. It thereby
applied the principle that penal provisions may not operate
retroactively. It noted that this principle is common to the legal
order of the member states, is enshrined in Article 7 of the
European Convention and is among the general principles of
law the observance of which is ensured by the court.' This
case entailed an expansive use of human rights norms in two
respects. First, the judgment rests on the human rights noima.
Second, the human rights principle is applied not to review
Community legislation, but the conduct of one of the member
states, the prosecution of Kirk by U.K. officials. This judgment
appears to follow the more expansive approach of Nold, al-
though not specifically referring to the older judgment in this
regard.' 4
46/87 and 227/88, Hoechst AG v. Commission, 1989 E.C.R. 2859, in which the court
ruled that enterprises under investigation by the Commission for violation of the
competition rules (Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty) have a right to protection
against arbitrary investigations. In conducting its investigation the Commission is
required to observe the procedural formalities regarding search warrants in effect in
the member state in which the search is to take place. See also Case 136/79, Nation-
al Panasonic (UK) Ltd. v. Commission, 1980 E.C.R. 2033.
63. Kirk, 1984 E.C.R. at 2718.
64. The British action was thought closely related both to a Community interest
and a Community regulation. The new regulation, that of January 25, 1983, did au-
thorize the British to detain the Danish vessel from January 1, 1983. The court noted
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In its recent case involving human rights issues, SPUC v.
Grogan,6" the court took a more conservative approach to gen-
eralized human rights issues, following the rationale of a case
decided six years earlier.66 In this well known case the court
confronted the highly charged issue of abortion.
The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children ("SPUC")
is an Irish company whose purpose is to prevent the decrimi-
nalization of abortion and promote human life from the moment
of conception. Stephen Grogan was an officer of one of several
Irish university student organizations which had published
information regarding the availability of abortion services in the
United Kingdom, including the names and addresses of a num-
ber of clinics in the U.K. performing abortion procedures. SPUC
instituted a proceeding in the Irish High Court for a declara-
tion that the publication of such information was illegal and for
an injunction restrainink the publication or distribution of such
information.
The High Court decided to refer several questions to the
Court of Justice.67 The first and second referred questions
were Community law-based in the narrower sense. The third
question contained a human rights aspect." The Advocate
that the retroactive aspect of the regulation could not validate ex post facto imposi-
tion of criminal penalties. Id.
65. Case 159/90, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd.
(SPUC) v. Grogan, 1991 E.C.R. 4685. See Grainne de Burca, Fundamental Human
Rights and the Reach of EC Law, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (1993); Siofra
O'Leary, The Court of Justice as a Reluctant Constitutional Adjudicator: An Examina-
tion of the Abortion Information Case, 17 EUR. L. REV. 138 (1992); Diarmuid Rossa
Phelan, Right to Life of the Unborn v. Promotion of Trade in Services: The European
Court of Justice and the Normative Shaping of the European Union, 55 MOD. L. REV.
670 (1992).
66. See infra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
67. The procedural history of the case is somewhat convoluted. The Irish trial
court (the Irish High Court) determined that it should refer certain questions to the
Court of Justice of the European Communities under Article 177 of the Treaty of
Rome. The SPUC appealed that decision to the Irish Supreme Court. The Irish Su-
preme Court granted an injunction restraining defendants from printing, publishing or
distributing any information giving the identity, location or means of communicating
with clinics providing abortions. The Irish Supreme Court did not, however, quash
that part of the High Court's decision which referred questions to the Court of Jus-
tice. Instead, it gave the parties leave to apply to the High Court for a modification
of the Supreme Court's injunction in light of the eventual opinion of the Court of
Justice. The High Court subsequently made the referral.
68. The three questions referred were:
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General in his opinion argued that consumers' freedom to shop
in another member state for a particular service is restricted if
they are deprived in their country of information regarding the
service. And he extended this conclusion to include receipt of
information from a person who is not the provider of the ser-
vice."
The Court of Justice noted that while the third question
referred to Community law in general, the question should be
focused on Articles 59 et seq. of the Treaty of Rome regarding
freedom to provide services and the argument regarding human
rights.
In its judgment, the court deftly decoupled the question of
human or fundamental rights as an inherent element of Com-
munity law from Community law in the narrower sense. It
noted that the information disseminated was not provided on
behalf of the economic operator of the clinic. It stated that
quite to the contrary the information constituted a manifesta-
tion of the freedom of expression and the freedom to impart
and receive information which was independent from the eco-
nomic activity of the clinics." Thus, distribution of the infor-
mation became a free-standing issue and one that could not be
considered a restriction on services within the meaning of Arti-
cle 59 et seq. of the Treaty of Rome.
1. Does the organized activity of carrying out an abortion constitute a "service
within the meaning of Article 60 of the EC Treaty?
2. In the absence of Community-based measures for the approximation of mem-
ber state laws regarding the organized activity or process of carrying out abortions,
can member states prohibit distribution of specific information regarding the identity
location and telephone numbers of clinics in other member states where abortions are
performed?
3. Does a person in member state A have a right in Community law to distrib-
ute information about the identity, location and telephone numbers of clinics in mem-
ber state B where abortions are performed when the provision of abortion is prohibit-
ed under the law of member state A but is lawful under the law of member state B?
1991 E.C.R. at 4689.
The third question does not contain the words human or fundamental rights.
Rather, it is an open-ended question asking whether there is any right in Community
law to distribute the information in question. Under the jurisprudence of the prior
human rights cases which stand for the proposition that fundamental or human
rights are part of Community law, this question does in part ask if the human rights
law of the Community confers such a right.
69. Grogan, 1991 E.C.R. at 4712-13 (Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven).
70. Grogan, 1991 E.C.R. at 4740.
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Having decoupled the freedom of expression and freedom to
impart and receive information issues from the narrower Com-
munity law issues as contained in Article 59, the court then
went on to consider whether such prohibitions violate portions
of the European Convention for Human Rights, in particular
Article 10(1) regarding freedom of expression.7'
After this decoupling, the response to the issue of whether a
restriction on the freedom to impart information violated Com-
munity law became quite simple. The court acknowledged that
its responsibility upon a requested preliminary reference re-
garding the compatibility with Community law of a piece of
national legislation in a field of application of Community law
is to provide the national court with all of the elements of the
interpretation necessary in order to enable it to assess the
compatibility of the legislation with fundamental rights, in
particular those in the European Convention the observance of
which the court assures. 2 However, the Court of Justice
determined that it has no such jurisdiction with regard to na-
tional law lying outside the scope of Community law. 3 From
this premise the court concluded that the reply to the Irish
court must be that it is not contrary to Community law for
member states to prohibit distribution of information of the
type in question when the clinics had no involvement in the
distribution. 4
The court thus neatly avoided ruling on a substantive issue
of controversy and great moral importance. But beyond that it
reinforced a notion stated in prior cases regarding the relation-
ship of human rights law and Community law as narrowly
described. Human rights norms embodied in the European
Convention, and by extension in the constitutional traditions of
71. The third question asked by the Irish court was whether there was a Com-
munity-based right to distribute information of the type in question. See supra note
68. The perspective was whether the distributor, Grogan, had such a right. The court
initially indicated that the question involved both the freedom to impart and receive
information, rights of both the provider and the receiver or consumer. 1991 E.C.R. at
4740. But, the court addressed the issue and responded in its judgment only to the
question asked that is whether a distributor has the right to impart information. The
consumer's right to receive it was not addressed.
72. 1991 E.C.R. at 4041.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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the member states, are not part of Community law to be ap-
plied by the court generally. The fact that human rights norms
may be part of the law applied by the court does not incorpo-
rate such norms into Community law or broaden the corpus of
it. The assumption behind the ruling in Grogan is that Com-
munity law was not broadened to encompass Article 10 of the
European Convention for Human Rights. The court stated that
national legislation in a field of application of Community law
must be reviewed for conformity to Community law including
fundamental rights, but that the court has no such jurisdiction
when the national legislation is outside the scope of Community
law.75 If Article 10 were part of Community law, the national
legislation at issue in Grogan would be within the scope of
Community law.
This approach is not new with the Grogan case. In fact, the
court was following the rationale of its opinion six years earlier
in the Cindth~que78 case and applied about four months prior
to Grogan in the Elliniki Radiofonia" case.
By statute and decree78 France generally prohibited the pro-
duction or sale of video cassette and video disc versions of films
released for showing in cinemas for a period of twelve months
from the date of the issuance of a performance certificate.
Cindth~que obtained a right to produce and sell video cassettes
of a film before the expiration of the year. The French Film
Federation obtained an order seizing the cassettes until the end
of the one-year period. Cingth~que brought an action in the
Tribunal de Grande Instance in Paris to have the order lifted.
That court made a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice
asking whether the statute and decree were compatible with
the provisions of Articles 30 and 34 of the EC Treaty on the
free movement of goods. The court determined that the legisla-
tion was not incompatible with the free movement provisions.7"
75. Id.
76. Cases 60 & 61184, Cindth~que SA v. F~dration nationale des cinemas
francais, 1985 E.C.R. 2604.
77. Case 260/89, Elliniki Radiofonia Tileorassi Anonimi Etairia v. Dimotiki Etairia
Pliriforissis, 1991 E.C.R. 2951.
78. Law No. 82-652 of 29 July, 1982, art. 89; implemented by Decree 83-4 of 4
January, 1983.
79. 1985 E.C.R. at 2625-26.
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Cindthque also argued that the French legislation violated the
principle of freedom of expression in Article 10 of the European
Convention and was thus incompatible with Community law."0
With respect to that argument the court acknowledged its duty
to protect fundamental rights within' the field of Community
law, but indicated that it had no power to examine the compat-
ibility with the European Convention for Human Rights of
national legislation falling in an area of national jurisdiction."'
Again, only Community law in the narrow sense or national
law in an area of Community law in the narrow sense are to be
reviewed for compatibility with human rights norms. Communi-
ty law is not broadened to include such norms as positive
law.82
From the foregoing brief overview of the legislative initiatives
and the court's judgments it is obvious that the Community's
involvement with human rights exists at many levels. How this
involvement may be affected by subsidiarity, even assuming a
clearer understanding of the term, is uncertain, but will no
doubt vary from institution to institution, by type of initiative,
and by the supporting EC Treaty provision or Community
policy.
There is reason for optimism-from the perspective of in-
creased attention to and enforcement of human rights-but
80. Id. at 2627.
81. Id. Again the ambit of Community law was not expanded to include Article
10.
In Elliniki Radiofonia, by Greek constitutional provision and legislation, radio
and television broadcast rights were exclusively held by a state run company, Elliniki
Radiofonia Tileorassi ("ERT"). ERT brought an action in a Greek court to enforce this
exclusive franchise against a competitor company. Defendant argued in part that its
right to broadcast was protected by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights. The Greek court referred a number of questions to the Court of Justice.
Among them was whether Article 10 imposed obligations on the member states inde-
pendent of the written provisions of Community law. 1991 E.C.R. at 2957. The court
reiterated that human rights norms form an integral part of the general principles of
law, the observance of which the court assures. It determined, however, that it has
no jurisdiction to examine the compatibility with those principles of national legisla-
tion not falling within the scope of Community law. Id. at 2964.
82. The approach in the Kirk opinion is different and is more consistent with the
broad reading of the Nold opinion. In Kirk the fundamental right to be free from ex
post facto application of penal law was used as the basis- for the conclusion that
Kirk's prosecution was unwarranted. However, that fundamental right was not en-
cased in Community law in the narrow sense. But see supra note 64.
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there is also at least as much reason for pessimism. If the
principle of subsidiarity were faithfully adhered to, the likely
result would certainly not be greater Community initiative and
involvement in the sphere of human rights, and more likely it
would be less involvement.
On the optimistic side, the TEU contains specific references
to human rights-references not directly fettered by the
subsidiarity principle. In Title I of the TEU the members of the
European Union specifically commit themselves to respect as
general principles of Community law the fundamental rights
guaranteed by the European Convention for Human Rights and
the constitutional traditions of the member states.83 Moreover,
the Community institutions are specifically charged in Title I
with exercising their powers under the conditions and for the
purposes set forth in both the EC Treaty and the TEU.' Thus,
one could expect more activity in the human rights area not
less. But such a reading of the TEU provides only an illusion of
more intense effort. As early as 197785 the three political insti-
tutions pledged to do practically as much as that with which
Title I charges them. Thus, Title I does not charge the institu-
tions with, or exhort them to, a degree of activity much beyond
that which they pledged to exercise more than fifteen years ago.
Also, this injunction to the institutions in Title I is itself bur-
dened by the principle of subsidiarity. Although the institutions'
sources of authority are broadened by the addition of the TEU,
the other source of authority is the EC Treaty in which
subsidiarity is embedded. Moreover, the TEU notes that the
objectives of the European Union are to be accomplished while
respecting subsidiarity.6
Also on the optimistic side, other provisions of the TEU spe-
cifically charge the Council to act in certain respects. In order
to achieve the objectives of the Union, in particular the free
83. TEU, supra note 4, tit. I, art. F.
84. Id. art. E. The authority of the Council, Commission and Parliament now
comes from two strains, the EC Treaty and the TEU. The authority of the Court of
Justice has not been similarly expanded, however. The court's authority is essentially
limited to applying the law arising out of the EC Treaty. See supra note 6.
85. See supra note 1.
86. TEU, supra note 4, tit. I, art. B. The European Council accepts that
subsidiarity applies to action within the European Union. Subsidiarity Guidelines,
supra note 13, at 7.
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movement of persons, member states are to consider certain
areas, including asylum and immigration policies, to be matters
of common concern." In so doing the member states are to
consult one another within the Council, and the Council may
adopt and implement joint action if such seems a better way of
achieving the objective than member state action."
Finally, subsidiarity will have no effect in some areas in
which, to date, the Community's legislative human rights activi-
ty has been centered. Much of the Community's legislative
measures are of a character supported by treaty provision and
are in areas which the Commission believes are within its ex-
clusive competence.89 Further, Community legislation regard-
ing, for example, the free movement of workers under Articles
47 through 52 of the EC Treaty would be free from
subsidiarity 0
However, human rights measures taken in support of other
significant portions of the EC Treaty, as, for example, the So-
cial Policy, Articles 117 through 122, are of a different order.
The Commission does not claim the Social Policy portion of the
treaty to be within its exclusive competence.9' And not even
the expansive conclusion that future Community action in virtu-
ally every area of action under the Treaty of Rome 2 is unfet-
tered by subsidiarity could free proposals within this portion of
87. TEU, supra note 4, tit. VI, art. K.1.
88. Id. art. K.3(1)(b). This provision, however, contains its own version of the
subsidiarity principle:
The Council may:... adopt joint action in so far as the objectives of the
union can be attained better by joint action than by the Member States
acting individually on account of the scale of effects of the action envis-
aged ....
Id.
89. See supra note 27.
90. The Commission could articulate several Community objectives to be served by
proposed legislation, one of which fits clearly within an area of exclusive competence
and another of which does not. The Commission is not likely to use such a device to
put forth human rights-based initiatives, and then claim that the area is covered by
the proposal because it is within its exclusive competence. The Commission is of the
view that such 'joined objectives" do not enlarge the areas of Community exclusive
competence to include the "appended areas." See supra note 27.
91. That is so except to the extent that measures fall within the accomplishment
of the single market or free movement of workers, as for example Article 121's provi-
sion regarding social security for migrant workers. See supra note 27.
92. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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the EC Treaty from subsidiarity. The obligations of the treaty
under these articles are for the most part imposed on the mem-
ber states. For example, Article 119 provides that the member
states shall ensure gender equality of pay. And the
Community's main initiative in support of this Article93 specifi-
cally acknowledges that it is primarily the responsibility of the
member states to ensure application of that principle. 4
Any future Community-initiated comprehensive human rights
measures would seem to be enmeshed in subsidiarity. Such
potential initiatives also illustrate the serious conceptual diffi-
culty of the exclusive versus shared competence dichotomy.
Comprehensive initiatives surely are within national compe-
tence, or at best may be matters of shared competence. If they
are matters of national competence, then, of course the Commu-
nity has no right to act. If such initiatives are thought to be of
shared. competence, then any Community's action regarding
them must meet the test of subsidiarity.
Shared competence is said to mean that both the member
states and the Community have the initial right to act in the
sphere. But once the Community enters it, the sphere is said to
come within the Community's exclusive competence.95 That the
Community has broadly acted in the human rights sphere, no
one can doubt.96 But it is incredible and disingenuous to assert
that by so doing it has ousted the member states from action in
this area. Surely neither the Community institutions nor the
member states would accept that Community action ousted
member states from future action. Yet that might be the con-
clusion dictated by the definition of shared competence.97 The
93. Council Directive of Feb. 10, 1975 on the Approximation of the Laws of the
Member States Relating to the Application of the Principle of Equal Pay for Equal
Work, 1975 O.J. (L 45) 19 [hereinafter Equal Pay].
94. Id. at preamble. A major initiative regarding worker rights, the Community
Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, adopted by all EC members
except the United Kingdom at the European Council meeting in December 1989 (the
text is contained in GEORGE A. BERMANN, ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW: SE-
LECTED DOCUMENTS (1993), and BERNARD RUDDEN & DERRICK WYATT, BASIC COMMU-
NITY LAWS (4th ed. 1993)) accepts in the preamble that under the principle of
subsidiarity responsibility for implementation of the rights set forth lies with the
member states. See also Equal Pay, supra note 93, art. 27.
95. See infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 38.
97. The Adaptation Report, supra note 15, does not discuss human rights mea-
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position of human rights initiatives in this dichotomy highlights
an unreal aspect of the dichotomy and, as a consequence, of
subsidiarity itself.
If one looks at the spirit of subsidiarity rather than the
definitional sophistry of exclusive or shared competence, Com-
munity-based broad human rights initiatives probably would be
subject to subsidiarity scrutiny.
The member states of the Community are all members of the
Council of Europe and are signatories to the European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights, one of the most com-
prehensive and effective human rights instruments extant, and
one with a most effective enforcement procedure." Indeed, the
Community member states as members of the European Union
explicitly undertake to respect the human rights guaranteed by
the Convention.9"
Given this commitment by the member states to that instru-
ment and its enforcement system, it is difficult to see how Com-
munity-generated comprehensive human rights initiatives could
meet the subsidiarity test. The member states are acting, and
effectively. Thus, movements as have taken place in the past to
have the Community assent to the European Convention'
and Parliament's Declaration of Fundamental Rights'0 ' would
seem unwarranted under the principle.
0 2
sures generally. In its discussion of measures which ought to be reviewed or recast in
view of the subsidiarity principle, it does suggest that the treatment of the right to
residence is scattered throughout many pieces of legislation and should be consolidat-
ed. Id. at 10. Likewise, certain measures regarding free movement of workers should
be consolidated. Id. at 18. The Commission noted that legislation under the Social
Policy was too recent to warrant examination and instead should be supplemented
with legislation to implement the Charter on the Fundamental Social Rights of
Workers.
98. See generally, BEDDARD, supra note 32.
99. TEU, supra note 4, tit. I, Article F.
100. Memorandum of the Commission of the European Community, 11 BULL. EUR.
COMUNITY, Supp. 2, (1979); 23 BULL. EUR. COmMUNITY, No. 1, para. 72, (1990).
101. 1989 O.J. (C 120) 51.
102. The argument can be made that Community assent to the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights is justified under subsidiarity. Having the Convention incor-
porated into the member states' domestic legal systems is an objective that could be
accomplished by this Community action. If the Community were to assent, the Con-
vention would likely be directly applicable and directly effective within the
Community's legal system. See Metropoulis, supra note 32. However, that objective
could also be achieved by the member states. The fact that some states, as the Unit-
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The Court of Justice certainly has one role, and arguably a
second role, regarding subsidiarity. First, it is widely agreed
that the principle is a justiciable one.' The court, therefore,
should employ it in reviewing legislation and action by Commu-
nity institutions. °4 That much seems non-controversial. There
is the additional question, however, of whether the court is
otherwise obligated under the principle. Clearly, the court as a
Community institution is bound to both act in accord with the
principle and, in a pro-active way, to make the principle
work. ' There is nothing in Article 3b to suggest whether or
how the court might or ought to act, or mold its jurisprudence,
in accord with the principle.
Admittedly, the principle is primarily addressed to the
Community's three political institutions. The European Council
in its Subsidiarity Guidelines, however, emphasized that to
make the principle work is an obligation of all of the institu-
tions.' ° But in explaining how the institutions might accom-
plish this task, it limited its discussion to the Commission and
the Council.' 7 Also, Article 3b provides that the Community
should take action only when, and so far as, "the proposed
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member
states . . . ."1' This reference to "proposed action" surely en-
compasses action by the political institutions. Perhaps the work
of the court is not within the meaning of "proposed action." On
ed Kingdom, have chosen not to so act raises the question of whether such objective
cannot better be achieved by Community action. Such inaction also raises the ques-
tion, however, of whether such objective is appropriately a Community one, as op-
posed to a purely national one.
103. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
104. Subsidiarity is not only a check on the Community, however. It is also a
check on the member states. See Subsidiarity Guidelines, supra note 13, at 8; Adap-
tation Report, supra note 15, at 2. The court can employ it in assessing the appropri-
ateness of member state action in an area of Community exclusive competence. The
likelihood of challenges on subsidiarity grounds to Community action and to member
state action will cause a more rigorous delineation of the contours of the
Community's exclusive competence.
105. Subsidiarity Guidelines, supra note 13, at 8, 11.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 11. The Adaptation Report, supra note 15, is in part the Commission's
response to the European Council's urging in the Subsidiarity Guidelines for action by
all of the institutions.
108. TEU, supra note 4, tit. II, art. G.B(4).
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the other hand there is nothing to exclude the work of the
court, or a particular judgment.
In the vast majority of the court's cases, the question of
whether or how it ought to mold its jurisprudence in view of
subsidiarity is completely idle. The court most often is inter-
preting completely Community-based law or is applying such
law to action or inaction by a Community institution or a mem-
ber state. Any assessment of the appropriateness of Community
versus national action in these settings simply is not germane.
Human rights, alas, may be an area in which the question of
whether or how subsidiarity should cause the court to act be-
comes a real one.
The Court of Justice has repeatedly committed itself to the
notion that the fundamental rights as found in the constitution-
al traditions of the member states or international human
rights agreements are part of the general principles of law
which it will apply. Such principles are kept by the court in the
separate category of general principles of law. They are not
part of Community law which is directly applicable or directly
effective.
The spirit of subsidiarity is that action should be taken at
the Community level, even in areas in which the Community
has a clear interest, only when the objective of the action can
be better accomplished at the Community level than the nation-
al level.'0 9
Cases with human rights aspects arise under both the court's
contentious jurisdiction,"10 as in Nold,"' or under its prelimi-
nary reference jurisdiction, as in Grogan and Cingthque.
Within its contentious jurisdiction, the court is reviewing the
legality or appropriateness of Community legislation or action.
It is certainly appropriate for the court to determine, as it has,
that one aspect of the validity of Community secondary legisla-
tion or its application is conformity with fundamental rights.
109. See Adaptation Report, supra note 15, at 1.
110. TEU, supra note 4, art. 169-76, 179.
111. See also cases listed supra note 62.
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In cases coming under its reference jurisdiction, the question
becomes more difficult. In such cases, the court is not deciding
the case on the merits, it is merely giving an opinion to the na-
tional court on the questions presented to it by the national
court. In many such requests the questions call for the interpre-
tation of Community law. In these instances, like in the cases
coming under the contentious jurisdiction, it is appropriate for
the court to interpret Community law as requiring conformity
with human rights norms.
However, in other cases the questions asked of the court
require advice on the compatibility of national legislation or
action with Community law." 2 An argument can be made,
however, that in this part of its preliminary reference jurisdic-
tion, analysis of national legislation's compatibility with human
rights norms is not consistent with subsidiarity. The Court of
Justice opinion is not dispositive of the case. It is an opinion
regarding conformity of national legislation or action with Com-
munity law which the national court will apply. All member
states are signatories of the European Convention. The spirit of
subsidiarity might dictate that the question of compatibility of
such measures with human rights norms embodied in constitu-
tional law or international conventions should be left to the na-
tional court deciding the case. For example, why should the
Court of Justice decide as in Kirk that the arrest of Kirk violat-
ed the fundamental right against retroactive application of
penal laws? Is not the national court capable of such decision?
One response is that the national court would apply only its
112. Article 177 provides that the court may give a preliminary ruling regarding:
a) interpretation of the treaty; b) validity and interpretation of acts of Community
institutions; and c) interpretation of statutes of entities established by the Council.
There is no direct reference to national legislation or acts of member states. Hence,
on its face Article 177 could be read as not authorizing the court to give a prelimi-
nary ruling on matters of national law. However, national legislation or action is in
fact included within a) and b). The inquiry is whether Community law as properly
interpreted controls and thus overrides the national legislation.
For example, the third question asked in Grogan was whether there was a
right in Community law for a person in member state A to distribute information
about clinics providing abortion services in member state B when provision of abor-
tion is prohibited by the Constitution and laws of member state A, but is lawful
under the laws of member state B. See supra note 68. Also, in Kirk the question
asked was whether, having regard for all relevant Community law, did the United
Kingdom have the right after December 31, 1982 to exclude Danish-registered vessels
from fishing in British coastal waters. Kirk, 1984 E.C.R. at 2692.
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constitutional precepts, not those of the other members. Also, if
the various international human rights conventions are not in-
corporated into domestic law, as they are not in the United
Kingdom, the national court cannot apply them.
The court's current approach to the protection of fundamental
rights is respectful of subsidiarity. In both Grogan and
Cindth~que the court acknowledged that it had a duty to give
advice as to all elements of Community law, including human
rights norms, when the issue involved falls within the area of
Community law. But if the issue does not so fall, then the court
has no such jurisdiction. In both of these cases the court nar-
rowly defined the ambit of Community interest narrowly. This
would be consistent with subsidiarity in these opinions. The
court escaped the need to opine on the compatibility of the
measures with human rights norms. It also broadened the
ambit of national interest in fields where the Community cer-
tainly also has interests."'
While it is possible to argue that the court is obliged to take
the principle of subsidiarity into account in its judgments, the
court's current approach seems consistent with attention to this
obligation. Thus, subsidiarity may not entail any significant
radical shift in the court's approach, but it may discourage a
more expansive application of human rights norms.
113. In Grogan the court could have determined that the consumer's right to infor-
mation regarding services extended to information from sources other than the provid-
er of the services. In enforcing such a Community law right, it would have been
appropriate to review any restriction on it for conformity with Article 10 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights.
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